The U.S. Navy's investment in Ford-class supercarriers reflects a strategic decision that prioritizes large vessels over smaller alternatives.
Modern naval challenges require not just equipment but effective responses. The $13 billion allocated for the Ford-class supercarriers represents a commitment to formidable sea power. Why has the Navy opted for these colossal ship classes instead of exploring options like medium aircraft carriers?
The Case for Medium Carriers: Historical Context
During the Cold War, discussions about building CVV medium carriers emerged as a viable path forward for the Navy. Intended to complement and eventually replace the Midway-class, these conventionally powered carriers were proposed as cost-effective solutions to bolster naval capabilities without the exorbitant price tag of traditional supercarriers.
Initial support from Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan indicated a potential trajectory for these CVV carriers. However, the aftermath of the Vietnam War and subsequent military budget cuts reopened debates on the Navy's needs. Ultimately, the idea of developing medium carriers was shelved as the Navy opted for more Nimitz-class supercarriers instead.
Budget Cuts and Strategic Decisions: The Shift to High-End Power
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt faced a significant challenge after the Vietnam War, as funding cuts forced the Navy to rethink its strategy. The U.S. Navy budget was constrained, requiring a balance between naval might and financial viability.
The initially proposed CVV carriers, which would have been just over 900 feet long and designed to launch 60 aircraft, became increasingly impractical. Although they would supplement existing supercarriers, the decision was made to prioritize single-hulled carriers with nuclear power, allowing the Navy to maximize its assets. Zumwalt's vision ultimately leaned towards a mix of high-end and low-end platforms, favoring supercarriers capable of handling larger payloads and more significant missions.
The Downsides of Medium Carriers
The proposed CVV carriers came with their own set of advantages and disadvantages. Notable differences were
- Two steam catapults compared to the four typically found on larger carriers.
- Only two elevators for aircraft, rather than three on Nimitz-class vessels.
- Reduced air defense systems and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
- Conventional power sources as opposed to the nuclear power of the supercarriers.
Financial considerations heavily influenced the decision-making process. One hull with a six-thousand-man crew was significantly cheaper to operate than two hulls that would require a combined crew of nine thousand, yet yield the same number of operational aircraft. Kyle Mizokami argues that having larger carriers allows for more versatility and increased sortie rates, crucial in high-stakes naval operations.
A Diverging Perspective by John McCain
Senator John McCain, a Navy veteran, provided a counterargument in his legislation, advocating for the use of smaller carriers for day-to-day operations. He argued that while supercarriers are crucial for deterring significant adversaries, medium carriers effectively fulfill roles such as *power projection*, *sea lane control*, and *counter-terrorism*. This suggests a dual approach—retaining large nuclear carriers for high-intensity conflicts while utilizing smaller, conventionally powered carriers for routine operational needs.
Assessing the Role of Amphibious Assault Ships (LHAs)
The Naval Institute explored the potential of scaling back further by comparing large carriers to amphibious assault ships (LHAs). Even though LHAs cost about a third of what a Ford-class carrier entails, they come with significant limitations.
For instance
- LHAs cannot operate airborne early-warning systems like the E-2D Hawkeye.
- The lack of launch catapults restricts operational capabilities, specifically for aircraft recovery.
- Ford-class carriers boast 56 aircraft spots on the flight deck compared to only 20 spots available on LHAs, severely limiting operational scope and flexibility.
Additionally, the magazine capacity—essential for carrying out sustained strike operations—significantly favors supercarriers. The 375,000 cubic feet of armament storage on a Ford-class carrier starkly contrasts with the mere 16,000 cubic feet on an LHA, underscoring the importance of these larger carriers for extended combat operations.
Maximizing Flexibility for the Future
Turning to larger vessels provides the Navy with a broader range of strategic options, especially when unpredictable conflicts arise. The enhanced capabilities of Ford-class supercarriers support a more potent response to dynamic global threats from countries like China or Russia. Larger carriers are seen as adaptable, capable of evolving roles based on the mission requirements, whether defensive or offensive.
While debates about medium aircraft carriers persist, the Navy's current path strongly favors high-capacity supercarriers. The focus remains on maximizing their potential for air power projection—crucial in a landscape dominated by advanced air defense systems around the globe.
In essence, the decision to invest in Ford-class supercarriers over CVV carriers stems from a blend of historical context, financial feasibility, and strategic necessity. The lessons gleaned from past proposals highlight the ongoing challenge of modernizing naval power without compromising operational effectiveness. Ultimately, the Navy’s commitment underscores the adage: bigger ships harbor greater capabilities, and bigger has become synonymous with better in the realm of naval warfare.